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To study the eﬀects of tariﬀs on gross domestic product (GDP) one needs import demand
elasticities at the tariﬀ line level that are consistent with GDP maximization. These do not exist.
We modify Kohli’s (1991) GDP function approach to estimate demand elasticities for 4,625
imported goods in 117 countries. Following Anderson and Neary (1992, 1994) and Feenstra
(1995), we use these estimates to construct theoretically sound trade restrictiveness indices
(TRIs) and GDP losses associated with existing tariﬀ structures. Countries are revealed to be
30 percent more restrictive than their simple or import-weighted average tariﬀs would suggest.
Thus, distortion is nontrivial. GDP losses are largest in the United States, China, India, Mexico
and Germany.
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This paper proposes a methodology that is consistent with GDP maximization in estimating
import demand elasticities for more than 4,000 goods in 117 countries. Import demand is a function
of prices of all goods and aggregate endowments as in Kohli’s (1991) GDP function approach. We
found that homogeneous goods have higher elasticites, and point estimates increase as we increase
the level of disaggregation at which elasticities are estimated. Import demand is also more elastic
in large and rich countries. Using the estimated import demand elasticities, we compute the eﬀect
of tariﬀs on GDP using the theoretically sound trade restrictiveness index (TRI) developed by
Anderson and Neary (1992, 1994) and Feenstra (1995). TRI values are on average 30 percent
higher than simple or import-weigthed average tariﬀs. GDP losses are largest in the United States,
China, India, Mexico and Germany.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Import demand elasticities are crucial inputs into many ex-ante analyses of trade reform. To
evaluate the impact of regional trade agreements on trade ﬂows or customs revenue, one needs to
ﬁrst answer the question of how trade volumes would adjust. To estimate ad-valorem equivalents
of quotas or other non-tariﬀ barriers one often needs to transform quantity impacts into their price
equivalent, for which import elasticities are necessary. Moreover, trade policy is often determined
at much higher levels of disaggregation than existing import demand elasticities.1 This mismatch
can lead to serious aggregation biases when calculating the impact of trade interventions that have
become more of a surgical procedure. Finally, to compare trade restrictiveness and its associated
w e l f a r el o s s e sa c r o s sd i ﬀerent countries and time, one would need to have a consistent set of trade
elasticities, estimated using the same data and methodology that, ideally, would be consistent with
trade theory. These do not exist. The closest substitute and the one often used by trade economists
is the survey of the empirical literature put together by Stern et al. (1976). More recent attempts
to provide disaggregate estimates of import demand elasticities (although not necessarily price
elasticities, but Armington or income elasticities) have been country speciﬁc and have mainly
focused on the United States. These include Shiells, Stern and Deardorﬀ (1986), Shiells, Roland-
Holst and Reinert (1993), Blonigen and Wilson (1999), Marquez (1999, 2002, 2003), Broda and
Weinstein (2003) and Gallaway, McDaniel and Rivera (2003).
The primary objective of this paper is to ﬁll in this gap by estimating import demand elasticities
for over 4,625 goods (at the six digit of the Harmonized System (HS)) in 117 countries. We use
a methodology that is consistent with trade theory (i.e., imports are a function of prices and
factor endowments), and data sources are identical for all countries and goods. We then use these
estimates to construct theoretically sound measures of trade restrictiveness for 88 countries, based
on Feenstra’s (1995) simpliﬁcation of Anderson and Neary’s (1992, 1994, 2003) trade restrictiveness
index (TRI).2 The TRI is the uniform tariﬀ that would maintain welfare at the current level
under the observed tariﬀ structure. Finally, we used the constructed TRI to calculate the overall
1Trade policy is (almost by deﬁnition) often determined at the tariﬀ line level. To our knowledge the only set
of estimates of import demand elasticities at the six digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) that exist in the
literature are the one provides by Panagariya et al. (2001) for the import demand elasticity faced by Bangladesh
exporters of apparel and the elasticities of substitution across exporters to the US by Broda and Weinstein (2003).
2For the other 29 countries, we had no tariﬀ schedules available.
2deadweight loss associated with the current tariﬀ structure in each of the 88 countries.
The basic theoretical setup is the production based GDP function approach as in Kohli (1991)
and Harrigan (1997). This GDP function approach takes into account general equilibrium eﬀects
associated with the reallocation of resources due to exogenous changes in prices or endowments,
and has close links to trade theory. Imports are considered as inputs of domestic production, for
given exogenous world prices, productivity and endowments. In a world where a signiﬁcant share
of growth in world trade is explained by vertical specialization (Yi, 2003), the fact that imports
are treated as inputs into the GDP function — rather than as ﬁnal consumption goods as in most
of the previous literature — seems an attractive feature of this approach.3
While Kohli (1991) focuses mainly on aggregate import demand and export supply functions and
Harrigan (1997) on industry level export supply functions, this paper modiﬁes the GDP function
approach to estimate import price elasticities at the tariﬀ line level (HS six digit). When estimating
elasticities at the tariﬀ line level, dealing with cross-price eﬀects can become insurmountable. In
order to avoid running out of degrees of freedom in the estimation of the structural parameters of the
GDP function, we ﬁrst re-express each N-good economy into N sets of two-good economies using
properties associated with price indices in translog GDP functions. This transformation allows us
to go from a system of n equations with n price related structural parameters to be estimated in
each equation to a system of n equations with 2 price related parameters to be estimated. Another
practical problem we are facing is that the Harmonized System of trade classiﬁcation was only
introduced in the late 1980s, so even if we solve the n-good problem, we may still run out of
degrees of freedom if we were to estimate the diﬀerent parameters using only the time variation in
the data. Thus, assuming that the structural parameters of the GDP function are common across
countries (up to a constant) as in Harrigan (1997), we take advantage of the panel dimension of
the data set by applying within estimators. Finally, as in Kohli (1991), to ensure that second-order
conditions of the GDP maximization program are satisﬁed we impose the necessary curvature
conditions which ensure that all estimated import demand elasticities are negative. This requires
estimating the parameters of the import share equation using non-linear least squares.
More than 300,000 import demand elasticities have been estimated. The simple average across
3Kohli (1991) argues that most imported products when sold in the domestic market have some domestic value
added embedded, i.e., marketing and transport costs, which justiﬁes the assumption that they are inputs into the
GDP function.
3all countries and goods is about -1.67 and the median is -1.08. They are generally estimated with
great precision. The median t-statistics (obtained through bootstrapping) is 11.96 (91 percent of
t h ee s t i m a t e sa r es i g n i ﬁcant at the 5 percent level). We also found some interesting patterns in
our estimated import demand elasticities that are consistent with some simple hypothesis. First,
homogenous goods are shown to be more elastic than heterogenous goods. Second, import demand
is more elastic when estimated at the tariﬀ line, rather than at the more aggregate industry level.
Third, large countries tend to have more elastic import demands, due probability to a larger
availability of domestic substitutes. Fourth, more developed countries tend to have less elastic
import demands, mainly driven by a higher share of heterogenous goods in developed countries
import demand. In sum, the estimated import demand elasticities exhibit signiﬁcant variation
across countries and products that is consistent with some basic hypothesis.
Using the estimated import demand elasticities, we construct the TRI for 88 countries for which
tariﬀ schedules are available. Results suggest that both simple and import-weighted average tariﬀs
tend to underestimate the restrictiveness of a country’s tariﬀ regime by an average of 30 percent.
Thus, GDP losses can be much larger than suggested by average tariﬀs. In particular, large losses
are found in the United States, China, India, Mexico and Germany.
Section 2 provides the theoretical framework to estimate import demand elasticities, whereas
section 3 describes the empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses data sources. Section 5 presents
the results and explores patterns across goods and countries. Section 6 applies the estimated
import demand elasticities to construct TRIs and deadweight losses associated with existing tariﬀ
structures. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model — GDP Function Approach
The theoretical model follows Kohli’s (1991) GDP function approach for the estimation of trade
elasticities. We also draw on Harrigan’s (1997) treatment of productivity terms in GDP functions.
We will ﬁrst derive the GDP and import demand functions for one country. However, assuming
that the GDP function is common across all countries up to a country speciﬁc term —which controls
for country productivity diﬀerences— it is then easily generalized to a multi-country setting in the
next section.
4Consider a small open economy in period t.4 Let St ⊂ RN+M be the strictly convex pro-














≥ 0. For the elements in the net output vector qt, we adopt the convention that
positive numbers denote outputs, which include exports, and negative numbers denote inputs,
which include imported goods. We consider imported goods and competing domestically produced
g o o d sa sd i ﬀerentiated products. Similarly domestic products sold in the domestic market are
diﬀerentiated from products sold in foreign markets (i.e., exported).
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, is the maximum value of goods the economy can produce given prices, Hicks-
neutral productivity and factor endowments in period t. It equals to the total value of output for
exports and ﬁnal domestic consumption minus the total value of imports (qt
n < 0 for imports).
In other words, the optimal net output vector is chosen to maximize GDP in equilibrium, given
prices, productivity and endowments. We shall refer to the optimal net output vector as the GDP
maximizing net output vector, which includes GDP maximizing import demands.
As shown in Harrigan (1997), Equation (2) highlights that price and productivity enter mul-
tiplicatively in the GDP function, Gt  
˜ ptAt,vt 
. This property allows us to re-express the GDP


















pt ≡ ˜ ptAt, and pt
n ≡ ˜ pt
nAt
n,∀n. (4)
Notice that the productivity inclusive price vector, pt, is no longer common across country even
though the world price vector, ˜ pt, i si d e n t i c a la c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .T h i sa l l o w st h em o d e lt ob e t t e rﬁt
4For a discussion of the relevance of the small country assumption when estimating trade elasticities, see Riedel
(1988), Athukorala and Riedel (1994) and Panagariya et al. (2001).
5the data where diﬀerent world prices are observed for the same good in diﬀerent countries. In a
recent study, Schott (2004) successfully explains variation in unit values for goods in the same tariﬀ
line but in diﬀerent countries with GDP per capita levels. To the extent that GDP per capita is a
proxy for labor productivity, Schott’s ﬁnding provides support for our productivity inclusive price
level, pt.
For Gt  
pt,vt 
to be a well deﬁned GDP function, it is assumed to be homogeneous of degree
one with respect to prices. Moreover, strict convexity of St also ensures that the second order
suﬃcient conditions are satisﬁed, such that Gt  
pt,vt 
is twice diﬀerentiable and it is convex in pt
and concave in vt. To derive import demand function, we apply the Envelope Theorem, which
shows that the gradient of Gt  
pt,vt 












, ∀n =1 ,...,N. (5)
Thus if good n is an imported good, Equation (5) would be the GDP maximizing import demand
function of good n, which is a function of prices and endowments. It also implies that an increase
in import prices would reduce GDP (i.e., qt
n < 0 if n is an imported good). Given that Gt  
pt,vt 
is
continuous and twice diﬀerentiable, and is convex and homogeneous of degree one with respect to
prices, the Euler Theorem implies that qt
n is homogenous of degree zero in prices, has non-negative






















n , ∀n  = k
. (6)
In other words, for every ﬁnal good, including exports, a price increase raises output supply;f o r
every input, including imports, an increase in prices decreases input demand. In addition, if an
increase in the price of an imported input causes supply of an exported output to decrease, then
an increase in the price of the exported output would increase the demand of the imported input
in the same magnitude.
Equation (5) shows that the GDP maximizing import demand function of good n is a function
5The latter by Young’s Theorem.
6of prices and factor endowments. Thus, the implied own price eﬀects of imports, and the import
demand elasticities, are therefore conditioned on prices of other goods and aggregate endowments
being ﬁxed. Thus, the GDP maximizing import demand functions do not depend on income or util-
ity, unlike the expenditure minimizing Hicksian import demand functions or the utility maximizing
Marshallian import demand functions. This is because, aggregate factor income and welfare are in
fact endogenous to prices and endowments. Such a set up is more relevant for general equilibrium
trade models, but may not be relevant for partial equilibrium micro models which often take aggre-
gate income as exogenous. As a result, comparing the GDP maximizing import demand elasticities
to the existing Hicksian or Marshallian import demand elasticities in the literature may not be
appropriate. Finally, we will not be able to derive income elasticities from the GDP maximizing
import demand functions, but instead, we would be able to estimate the Rybczynski elasticities
from Equation (5), which shows how import demand reacts to changes in factor endowments.6
To implement the above GDP function empirically, let’s assume, without loss of generality, that
Gt  
pt,vt 
follows a ﬂexible translog functional form with respect to prices and endowments, where













































where all the translog parameters a, b and c s are indexed by t to allow for changes over time. In
order to make sure that Equation (7) satisﬁes the homogeneity and symmetry properties of a GDP












nm =0 ,a t
nk = at
kn, ∀n,k =1 ,...,N, ∀m =1 ,...,M. (8)
Furthermore, if we assume that the GDP function is homogeneous of degree one in factor endow-
6See Section 5.3 of Kohli (1991) for a thorough discussion on the various import demand speciﬁcations.












nm =0 ,b t
nk = bt
kn, ∀n,k =1 ,...,N, ∀m =1 ,...,M. (9)
Given the translog functional form and the symmetry and homogeneity restrictions, the deriva-
tive of lnGt  
pt,vt 
with respect to lnpt






































m, ∀n =1 ,...,N, (10)
where st
n is the share of imports of good n in GDP (st
n < 0 if good n is an input as in the case
of imports). From Equation (10) i tc a nb es h o w nt h a t ,i fg o o dn is an imported good, then the



















n − 1 ≤ 0, ∀st
n < 0. (11)
Thus we can infer the import demand elasticities once ann is properly estimated based on Equation
(10). Note that the size of the import elasticity, εt
nn, depends on the sign of at
nn, which captures




   
   
< −1 if at
nn > 0,
= −1 if at
nn =0 ,
> −1 if at
nn < 0.





,t h e nt h ei m p l i e di m p o r td e m a n di su n i t a r ye l a s t i cs u c ht h a ta ni n c r e a s ei ni m p o r t
price induces an equi-proportional decrease in import quantities and leaves the value of imports
unchanged. If the share of imports in GDP, which is negative by construction, decreases with






















, then the implied import demand is inelastic, so that an increase in import
price induces a less than proportionate decrease in import quantities. Finally, if the share of import





, then the implied import demand must be elastic
such that an increase in the price of import induces a more than proportionate decrease in import
quantity.8
3 Empirical Strategy
With data on output shares, unit values and factor endowments, Equation (10) is the basis of our
estimation of import elasticities. In principle, we could ﬁrst estimate the own price eﬀects, at
nn, for
every good according to Equation (10), and apply Equation (11) to derive the implied estimated
elasticities, since the own price elasticity is a linear function of own partial eﬀects. There are,
however, at least three problems with the estimation of the elasticities using (10). First, there
are literally thousands of goods traded among the countries in any given year. Moreover, there
is also a large number of non-traded commodities that compete for scarce factor endowments and
contribute to GDP in each country. Thus the number of explanatory variables in Equation (10)
could easily exhausts our degrees of freedom or introduce serious collinearity problems. Second,
even after solving this ﬁrst problem, we could also run out of degrees of freedom given the short
time span of trade data available at the six digit of the HS —which only started being used in the
late 1980s. Finally, there is nothing so far to ensure that the estimated elasticities satisfy second
order conditions of GDP maximization, i.e., there are negative. We tackle these three problems in
turn.
3.1 From an N good economy to N sets of two-good economies
Given that our objective is to estimate the own price eﬀect, at
nn, for every good n, we re-express

















8Kohli (1991) found an inelastic demand for the aggregate US imports with ann < 0, while highly elastic demand
for the durables and services imports of the US, with the corresponding ann > 0, when the aggregate import is broken
down into 3 disaggregate groups.
9where for every good n, we construct a price index, pt
−n, and a quantity index, qt
−n, such that their









With the appropriate price and quantity indexes of good −n, the translog speciﬁcation of Equation
(12) and the implied share equations for good n c o u l dt h e nb eu s et oe s t i m a t et h eo w np r i c ee ﬀect













































































For the above two good economy to be equivalent to the N good economy, it is necessary
for Equations (13) and (14) to be equivalent to Equations (7) and (10). T h i sc o u l db et r u ei f
lnp−n is constructed in the following way.9 According to Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982), if
Gt  
pt,vt 
follows a translog functional form and assuming that all the translog parameters are time
invariant, at



























Gt(pt−1,vt). Re-writing Equation (15) by separating price index
of good n from the product term, and taking logarithm on both sides of the equations, we obtain
9For a more detailed description see Appendix A.
























































































Thus, in a two-good economy, the overall GDP deﬂator is the weighted average between the price
changes of good n and the composite good −n. In addition, according to Equation (17), with
information on the overall GDP deﬂator and the unit value of good n, the change in the price
index of the composite good −n is the diﬀerence between the change in the overall GDP deﬂator































By normalizing prices of all goods, both n and −n,t o1i nt h eﬁr s ty e a ro fo u rs a m p l e ,w ec a nt h e n
construct price indexes for goods n and −n in each sample country.
Imposing the additional assumption that all parameters in the GDP functions are time invariant,
and substituting Equation (17) into Equation (14) and equating Equation (14) with Equation (10),
it is clear that the following is necessarily true for the two good economy to be equivalent to the















  ≡ ank, ∀n, and k  = n. (19)
In order words, with the proper construction of lnpt
−n according to Equation (18) for every good
n, we can reduce a N-good economy which has N share equations with N price parameters each
into N two good economies, with N share equations with 2 price parameters each. The parameters
between the N-good economy and the two-good economy are related as indicated by Equation (19).
A more detailed proof is provided in the Appendix.
Thus, with the properly constructed lnpt
−n and the two good share equation, we reduce the
11challenging problem of estimating n − 1 cross price eﬀects for each good n into simply estimating
one own price eﬀect, ann, and a cross price eﬀect an−n. We further impose homogeneity constraints
to the two good share equation, so that ann + an−n =0and
 M
m=1 ct
nm =0 , and express the
two good share equation in terms of price of good n relative to good −n and factor endowment m






















With an additive stochastic error term, µt
n, to capture measurement errors, Equation (20) is the
basis used for the estimation of own price eﬀect, ann, and hence own price import elasticity, εnn.10
3.2 Using the panel variation in the data
Due to the limited time variation in the data and to take advantage of the panel nature of the
sample, Equation (20) is pooled across countries and years for each good n. We assume that the
structural parameters of the GDP function are time and country invariant (up to a constant) as in
Harrigan (1997). Notice that even though we assume that ann is common across all countries, the
implied own price elasticities will still vary across countries, given that st
nc is country speciﬁc( s e e
Equation (11)).
Pooling the data across countries and years and introducing country subscript c in Equation
(20), we further assume that the stochastic term, µt
n, has a two way error: one is country speciﬁc,
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n + ut
nc,u t
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Equation (21) allows for country and year ﬁxed-eﬀects, which enable us to capture any system-
10Note that in this two good economy set up, there is a system of two equations for each good, one for n and one
for −n. To avoid singularity in the estimation, we drop the equation for −n such that no cross equation restrictions
are necessary, and the estimation procedure is reduced to a single equation estimation.
12atic shift in the share equation that is country or year speciﬁc. We apply the within estimator to
estimate Equation (21), by appropriately removing the country means and year means from each
variable (and adding back the overall mean), and express all variables in deviation form (with suﬃx
d):
dst















3.3 Ensuring second order conditions
For Equation (22) to be the solution to the GDP maximization program, second order necessary
conditions need to be satisﬁed (the Hessian matrix needs to be negative semi-deﬁnite). Such
conditions are also known as the curvature conditions which ensure that the GDP function is
smooth, diﬀerentiable, and convex with respect to output prices and concave with respect to input









Given that by construction st
nc < 0,t h ea b o v ei st r u ei f
ann ≥ ¯ sn (1 − ¯ sn), (23)
where ¯ sn is the maximum (negative) share in the sample for good n. For all variables we denote
such an observation (the ¯ sn maximum) with an over-bar. To ensure that the curvature conditions
are satisﬁed, we ﬁrst need to diﬀerence all observations with respect to the observation where the
curvature condition is most likely to be violated, and add back ¯ sn, so that the expected value of
the intercept equals the maximum share:
dst


























nc − ¯ u, ∀n. (24)
Such a procedure ensure that the expected value of the intercept is equal to the maximum share,
¯ sn,w i t h o u ta ﬀecting the slope coeﬃcients, ann and cnm. We then impose the constraint provided
13by Equation (23), by reparameterizing ann in Equation (24) as follows:
ann = τ2
nn +˜ a0n (1 − ˜ a0n),
where ˜ a0n and τnn are parameters to be estimated nonlinearly. Thus, the ﬁnal version of the share
equation is
dst
nc − d¯ sn +¯ sn =˜ a0n +
 
τ2




























where regression error term, ˜ ut
nc, has a normal distribution with expected value of zero and variance
˜ σ2. Given that ˜ a0n and τ is nonlinear with respect to ˜ ut
nc, nonlinear estimation techniques are
necessary.
Note that this may not be enough to ensure that all import demand elasticities are negative.
Indeed, if the estimated ˜ a0n turns out to be smaller than ¯ sn,t h e ns o m eo ft h ee l a s t i c i t i e sm a ys t i l l
turn out to be non-negative. In other words, this is not a deterministic setup and ¯ sn is only the
E(˜ a0n). Thus, when estimating the import share equation prior to diﬀerencing with respect to
the observation where the second order condition is more likely to be violated, if the error term of
a particular observation is positive, then the estimated elasticity for this observation will also be
positive. In those cases we impose ˜ a0n ≡ ¯ sn in the estimation procedure, which ensures that all
elasticities are negative. This occurs in less than 3 percent of the sample.
Finally, given that the import demand elasticity is non-linear in the estimated parameters we
estimate the standard errors of the import demand elasticities through bootstrapping (50 random
draws for each six digit HS good).
4D a t a
The data consist of import values and quantities reported by diﬀerent countries to the UN Comtrade
system at the six digit of the HS (around 4,600 products).11 The HS was introduced in 1988, but
11It is available at the World Bank through the World Integrated Trade System (WITS).
14aw i d eu s eo ft h i sc l a s s i ﬁcation system only started in the mid 1990s. The basic data set consists
of an unbalanced panel of imports for 117 countries at the six digit level of the HS for the period
1988-2002. The number of countries obviously varies across products depending on the presence of
import ﬂows and on the availability of trade statistics at the HS level.
There are three factor endowments included in the regression: labor, capital stock and agricul-
ture land. Data on labor force and agriculture land are from the World Development Indicators
(WDI, 2003). Data on capital endowments are constructed using the perpetual inventory method
based on real investment data in WDI (2003).
The estimation sample did not include tariﬀ lines where the recorded trade value at the at
the six digit level of the HS was below $50,000 per year. This eliminated less than 0.1 percent of
imports in the sample, and it is necessary in order to avoid biasing our results with economically
meaningless imports. The elasticities are constructed following Equation (11), where the import
share is the sample average (i.e., we constrained the elasticities to be time invariant). We also
purged the reported results from extreme values by dropping from the sample the top and bottom
0.5 percent of the estimates.
5 Empirical Results
To be precise, we estimate a total of 315,451 import demand elasticities at the six digit level of the
HS for 117 countries. The simple average across all countries and goods is -1.67 and the standard
deviation is 2.47 suggesting quite a bit of variance in the estimates. Figure 1 shows the Kernel
density estimate of the distribution of all estimated elasticities. The vertical line to the left denotes
the sample mean (-1.67), and the line to the right the sample median (-1.08).
All import demand elasticities are quite precisely estimated. The median t-statistics is around
-11.96. Around 89 percent of the elasticities are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level; 91 percent at the
5 percent level and 93 percent at the 10 percent level.
The estimates vary substantially across countries. The top three countries with the highest
average elasticity are Japan, United States and Brazil (-4.05, -3.39 and -3.38, respectively). The
three countries with the lowest average import demand elasticities are Surinam, Belize and Guyana
(-1.02, -1.03 and -1.03, respectively). Table 1 summarizes the elasticities by country providing the
15simple average, the standard deviation, the median and the import-weighted average elasticity.
The estimate also show some variation across products. Goods with the more elastic import
demands (on average across countries) at the six digit level of the HS include HS 520635 (Cotton
yarn), 854290 (Electronic integrated circuits), and 100810 (Buckwheat), with average elasticities of
-16.29, -12.89 and -11.72, respectively. Similarly, the least elastic import demands are found in HS
140291 (Vegetable residuals for stuﬃng), HS 420232 (Articles for pocket, plastic/textile materials)
and HS 290521 (Allyl Alcohol), with average elasticities of -0.52, -0.65 and -0.66.
Given the lack of existing estimates at the tariﬀ line level, we need some guidelines to judge our
results. Below we enumerate some predictions we expect to ﬁnd in the estimated import demand
elasticities:
1. The import demand for homogenous goods is more elastic than for heterogenous goods. Rauch
(1999) classiﬁes goods into these categories, which we can use to test the hypothesis.
2. Import demand is more elastic at the disaggregate level — the substitution eﬀect between
cotton shirts and wool shirts is larger than the substitution eﬀect between shirts and pants,
or garment and electronics. Thus, we expect the HS six digit estimates to be larger in
magnitude (more negative) than estimates at a more aggregate level, i.e., three digit level
ISIC classiﬁcation, which is formed of 29 industries, respectively. Broda and Weinstein (2004)
uses a similar guideline for their elasticities of substitution estimates.
3. Import demand is more elastic in large countries. The rationale is that in large countries
there is a larger range of domestically produced goods and therefore the sensitivity of import
demand to import prices is expected to be larger. In other words, it is easier to substitute
away from imports into domestically produced goods in large economies.
4. Import demand is less elastic in more developed countries. The relative demand for het-
erogenous goods is probably higher in rich countries. Given that heterogenous goods are less
elastic, we expect the import demand to be less elastic in rich countries.
As a preview of the ﬁrst prior that homogenous goods are more elastic, we compare the estimated
import demand elasticities for Metal (HS 72-83) with those of Machinery (HS 84-89), where the
former are expected to be more homogenous. The average import demand elasticity of Metal is
16-1.62 while it is -1.39 for Machinery. A simple mean test supported the hypothesis that Metal
import demand is more elastic than that of the Machinery, with a t-statistics of -13.02. Figure 2
presents the two Kernel density distribution of the estimated import demand elasticities for Metal
and Machineries tariﬀ l i n e sa c r o s sa l lc o u n t r i e s .
To properly test the homogenous vs heterogenous goods hypotheses, we use Rauch’s (1999)
classiﬁcation. Rauch groups four digit SITC goods into three categories: diﬀerentiated, reference
priced and homogenous goods. By matching our HS six digit products to the SITC schedule,
we are able to classify our products according to Rauch’s schedule. Table 2 provides the sample
a v e r a g e s ,m e d i a n sa n ds t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o n so ft h ee s t i m a t e di m p o r td e m a n de l a s t i c i t i e sa c c o r d i n g
to the three categories of goods. It is clear that the average elasticity is larger in magnitude
for homogenous goods, follows by the reference priced and diﬀerentiated goods. Simple mean tests
supported the hypotheses that homogenous goods are more elastic than reference priced goods, and
reference priced goods are more elastic than diﬀerentiated goods. The t-statistics of the two tests
are 7.23 and 19.50 respectively. Similarly, the median elasticity for diﬀerentiated goods is smaller
in magnitude than both reference priced and homogeneous goods. A simple rank test shows that
the median elasticity of diﬀerentiated goods is statistically smaller in magnitude than the rest, with
ap - v a l u ec l o s et o0 ,w h i l et h ed i ﬀerence between the median elasticities of reference price goods
and homogenous goods is not statistically signiﬁcant. All this suggests that diﬀerentiated goods
are less elastic than reference priced and homogeneous goods, which conﬁrms our ﬁrst ap r i o r i .
To test the second hypothesis, we reestimated import demand elasticities at the industry level,
through a concordance linking HS six digit classiﬁcation to ISIC three digit industry classiﬁcation.
Table 3 provides the average elasticity by country at the diﬀerent levels of aggregation. It conﬁrms
that elasticities are smaller in magnitude when estimated at the industry level than at the tariﬀ
line level. On average elasticities estimated at the six digit level of the HS are 39 percent higher
than those estimated at the three digit level of the ISIC.
In order to test the last two hypothesis we run the average elasticity at the country level on log
of GDP and GDP per capita. The conditional plots of these relationships are provided in Figures
3 and 4, as well as the estimated coeﬃcient and its standard error. They conﬁrm that import
demand is more elastic in large and less developed countries. Thus, the last two hypotheses cannot
17be rejected.12
6 Calculating TRIs and Deadweight Losses
The estimated import demand elasticities allow us to examine the trade restrictiveness and welfare
losses associated with the existing tariﬀ structure in 88 countries in our sample for which tariﬀ
schedules are available.13 More importantly, this can be done within a theoretically-sound frame-
work. The literature has traditionally measure trade restrictiveness using a-theoretical measures
such as simple and import-weigthed tariﬀs.14 As argued by Anderson and Neary (1992, 1994, 2003)
these have little theoretical foundations. Import-weighted averages tend to be downward bias, as
for example, they put zero weight on prohibitive tariﬀs and simple average tariﬀs put identical
weights on tariﬀs that may have very diﬀerent economic signiﬁcance. Anderson and Neary (1992,
1994) propose a trade restrictiveness index (TRI), which has a theoretically sound averaging proce-
dure. TRI is deﬁned as the uniform tariﬀ that yields the same real income, and therefore national
welfare, as the existing tariﬀ structure. Deadweight loss measures can also be constructed using
TRIs and theoretically consistent estimates of import demand elasticities, which in turn allows for
comparisons of welfare distortions associated with each country’s tariﬀ structure.
To calculate the TRI, one would ideally need to solve a full-ﬂedged general equilibrium model
for the uniform tariﬀ that could keep welfare constant given the observed tariﬀ structure. Feenstra
(1995) provides a simpliﬁcation of TRI, which only requires information on import demand elastic-
ities, share of imports and the current tariﬀ schedule. The major drawback of such simpliﬁcation
is that it ignores the general equilibrium of cross price eﬀects. Nonetheless, as an illustration of the
ﬁrst order eﬀect of trade distortions, the simpliﬁed TRI is informative:15
12We found similar patterns when regressing on the median elasticity by country. The coeﬃcient on GDP is 0.03
and on GDP per capita - 0.02 and both are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent leve.
13Data sources for tariﬀ data are United Nations’ Comtrade and the Integrated Database of the WTO. In this paper,
we abstract from measuring the trade restrictiveness of non-tariﬀ barriers, as well as the role of tariﬀ preferences in
eroding trade restrictiveness. For an attempt to do so, see Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004b).
14If NTB measures are to be considered, trade economist often use simple or import-weigthed coverage ratios of
NTBs.
15See Equation (3.5) in Feenstra (1995). Note that given our setup, the derivation in Feenstra (1995) is equivalent


























where tnc is the tariﬀ on good n in country c.T h u s ,t h e s i m p l i ﬁed TRI is the squared root of a
weighted average of squared tariﬀs, where weights are determined by the import demand elasticities
in each country. Given that tariﬀs are squared in Equation (26),T R I c depends not only on the
weighted average level of tariﬀs, but also its variance. In other words, high dispersion of tnc increases
TRIc, for a given weighted average; see Anderson and Neary (2004) for a thorough discussion of
the importance of tariﬀ dispersion when measuring trade restrictiveness.
Note that the numerator in Equation (26) is equal to the share in GDP of the deadweight loss
























Thus, with information on the current tariﬀ schedule, import shares and import demand elasticities,
we can construct both TRIc and DWLc. Given that we are using GDP maximizing import demand
elasticities instead of Hicksian elasticities as in Feenstra (1995), our measures of TRI and DWL are
consistent with GDP maximization.16
Results using Equations (26) and (27) are provided in Table 4. Table 4 also shows simple and
import-weighted average tariﬀs, as well as the variance of tariﬀs for 88 countries. The sample mean
average tariﬀs, import-weighted tariﬀs and TRI are 10.04, 8.95 and 13.15. The three indicators of
trade restrictiveness are highly correlated: the correlation coeﬃcient between TRI and the two other
measures is 0.91, and the correlation between the simple average tariﬀ and the import-weighted
tariﬀ is 0.96. Figure 5 provides a plot of TRIs versus simple average tariﬀsf o rt h e8 8c o u n t r i e si n
our sample. Observations tend to be above the 45 degree dotted line, which suggests that average
tariﬀs tend to underestimate the degree of trade restrictiveness as deﬁned by the TRI. Overall,
both simple and weighted average tariﬀs tend to underestimate TRI by about 30 percent. The
countries where underestimation is the largest are Estonia (EST), Norway (NOR), Sudan (SDN),
16See Kohli (1991), Equations 18.27 to 18.31.
19Oman (OMN), and the United States (USA). The magnitude of underestimation in these countries
is more than 70 percent. Among these countries, Norway, Sudan and the United States also have
very high variances as shown in Table 4 which explains the relatively large TRIs. Countries that
have the largest TRIs include India (IND), Morocco (MAR) and Tunisia (TUN).
To facilitate cross country comparison of trade distortion, Table 4 also provides DWL estimates
in millions of US dollars. United States, China, Mexico, India and Germany are the countries in
the sample with the largest losses associated with their existing tariﬀ structure. In particular, at
$7 billion per year, the DWL of the United States is more than a quarter of the sum of welfare
losses in our sample. Moreover, given that the TRI of the US presented in Table 4 is signiﬁcantly
higher than the average tariﬀ, the US deadweight loss estimate is larger then Feenstra’s (1992),
w h of o u n dt h a tt h ew e l f a r el o s si nt h eU Sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ha na v e r a g et a r i ﬀ of 3.7 percent was in
the range of $1.2 to 3.4 billion in 1985.
A few caveats. First, this version of TRI and DWL calculations only take into account the direct
own price eﬀects of tariﬀs. They ignore the cross price eﬀects of other tariﬀso ni m p o r td e m a n d .
Thus, at best, it represents the ﬁrst order impact of import demand and welfare due to tariﬀs.
Second, the calculation of TRI and DWL ignore the existence of non-tariﬀ barriers, such as quotas.
To the extent that non-tariﬀ barriers are the more binding constraints in distorting imports, TRI
and DWL presented here may only capture the lower bound of the nature of trade protections and
welfare distortions. Third, we have focused on most favored nation’s tariﬀs, ignoring the numerous
preferential agreements that may erode trade restrictiveness. Fourth, given the static nature of
our analysis, dynamics eﬀects associated with tariﬀs are ignored. Finally, we only include positive
import in the calculation of TRI and DWL. This ignores prohibitive tariﬀs. To correct for this, we
re-calculated TRI and DWL according to the following speciﬁcation, where we assume the demand











This out of sample prediction does not change our results. While TRI∗
c tend to be slightly smaller
than TRIc, the two TRI’s series have a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.99. This suggests that if the
restrictiveness of prohibitive tariﬀs on a particular good is (by deﬁnition) inﬁnite, their impact on
20the overall trade restrictiveness is marginal in our sample.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
A set of consistently estimated import demand elasticities at the tariﬀ line level is critical to
understand the consequences of trade liberalization. This paper is the ﬁrst attempt to provide a
theoretically consistent methodology to estimate import demand elasticities for a wide variety of
countries at the six digit level of the HS (4,625 tariﬀ lines). Moreover, the methodology can be
easily implemented with existing trade data.
We ﬁnd that the sample average import demand elasticities is -1.67, while the sample median
is -1.08. There is wide variation in import demand elasticities across countries and tariﬀ lines,
and the estimates exhibit some interesting patterns. First, homogeneous goods have more elastic
import demand than diﬀerentiated goods. Second, the average estimated elasticities decrease as we
increase the level of aggregation at which they are estimated. Third, large countries tend to have
more elastic import demands. Fourth, more developed countries tend to have less elastic import
demand.
In addition, we calculate trade restrictiveness indices (TRIs) and welfare losses associated with
the existing tariﬀ structures for 88 countries. We use a methodology that is both theoretically
sound, and more importantly consistent with our estimated elasticities. Results show that both
s i m p l ea n dw e i g h t e da v e r a g et a r i ﬀs tend to underestimate the distortion imposed by the tariﬀ
regime by 30 percent on average. Because of the large variance in the United States tariﬀ schedule,
underestimation of trade restrictiveness is among the largest. The simple and import-weighted
tariﬀs in the United States are around 4 percent, whereas the TRI is close to 15 percent. With
welfare losses at around $7 billion per year, the United States is the country in our sample whose
tariﬀ structure imposes the largest welfare costs on its nationals. It is followed by China, Mexico,
India and Germany. Finally, given the high TRI of the US, the $7 billion per year deadweight loss
estimate is also larger then previous ﬁndings of the literature which mainly use average tariﬀs.
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24AF r o m N t o2g o o d - e c o n o m i e s
This section constructs N two good economies from a N good economy. Consider a small economy



















Given the translog GDP function, if all the translog parameters are time invariant, then the exact





































−n is the non-good-n price index, which is the aggregate Tornqvist price index of all goods




Substituting Equation (32) into Equation (28), and further assuming that all the parameters of





= a0n + ann lnpt































1 − ¯ st
n
≡ ank, ∀n,k. (33)
Homogeneity of degree zero in prices implies
 N
k=1 ank =0 , ∀n. Equation (33) implies the following
25is necessary true:















which completes the illustration of how we can reduce an N-good economy into a two-good economy,
with the appropriate construction of the price index lnpt
−n.
B Aggregating elasticities to the industry level
Our estimation procedure in Section 3 could be applied to goods at any level of aggregation, provided
the adequate price indices have been constructed. This section provides an aggregation procedure
from six digit HS estimates to any higher level of aggregation for a translog GDP function.
Let good n ∈ A belong to industry A and good n ∈ B belong to industry B, and A ∪ B =















































A ss h o w ni nE q u a t i o n(29), the Tornqvist price index at the industry level is the weighted





















where ¯ st denotes the average share between two consecutive periods. To apply the above Tornqvist
price index, we need to assume that all the translog parameters at
nk a r et i m ei n v a r i a n t .
If we were to estimate our parameters at the industry level instead of the good level, the share
equation of industry A would be given by:
st
A = a0A + aAA lnpt
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A − 1. (37)
It can be further shown that the price elasticity of an industry is the weighted average of the own













27Table 1: Estimated elasticities: sample moments by country
Country Simple Standard Median Import Country Simple Standard Median Import
Average Deviation weighted Average Deviation weighted
average average
Albania (ALB) -1.12 -1.04 -1.04 -1.06 Italy (ITA) -2.1 -1.06 -1.07 -1.14
United Arab Em. (ARE) -1.38 -1.16 -1.11 -1.07 Jamaica (JAM) -1.16 -1.1 -1.08 -1.05
Argentina (ARG) -2.52 -1.13 -1.15 -1.26 Jordan (JOR) -1.16 -1.05 -1.07 -1.04
Armenia (ARM) -1.09 -1.06 -1.06 -1.05 Japan (JPN) -4.05 -1.23 -1.4 -1.37
Australia (AUS) -2.49 -1.1 -1.1 -1.19 Kenya (KEN) -1.26 -1.14 -1.1 -1.07
Austria (AUT) -1.8 -1.05 -1.04 -1.08 Korea (KOR) -2.08 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Azerbaijan (AZE) -1.18 -1.11 -1.1 -1.07 Lebanon (LBN) -1.26 -1.03 -1.02 -1.06
Burundi (BDI) -1.07 -1.19 -1.12 -1.05 Sri Lanka (LKA) -1.2 -1.1 -1.04 -1.06
Belgium (BEL) -1.51 -1.04 -1.05 -1.05 Lithuania (LTU) -1.2 -1.03 -1.02 -1.06
Benin (BEN) -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.05 Latvia (LVA) -1.16 -1.03 -1.02 -1.05
B u r k i n aF a s o( B F A ) - 1 . 1 - 1 . 1 2 - 1 . 0 8 - 1 . 0 5 Morocco (MAR) -1.45 -1.1 -1.05 -1.09
Bangladesh (BGD) -1.65 -1.2 -1.19 -1.15 Madagascar (MDG) -1.17 -1.12 -1.18 -1.09
Bulguria (BGR) -1.18 -1.05 -1.04 -1.06 Maldives (MDV) -1.04 -1.04 -1.03 -1.02
Belarus (BLR) -1.17 -1.04 -1.05 -1.05 Mexico (MEX) -2.08 -1.06 -1.07 -1.11
Belize (BLZ) -1.03 -1.05 -1.03 -1.03 Macedonia (MKD) -1.12 -1.04 -1.05 -1.05
Bolivia (BOL) -1.23 -1.07 -1.1 -1.08 Mali (MLI) -1.15 -1.19 -1.09 -1.06
Brazil (BRA) -3.38 -1.3 -1.22 -1.34 Malta (MLT) -1.09 -1.04 -1.02 -1.04
Barbados (BRB) -1.08 -1.04 -1.08 -1.04 Mongolia (MNG) -1.05 -1.06 -1.07 -1.03
C e n t r a lA f r .R e p .( C A F ) - 1 . 0 8 - 1 . 1 5 - 1 . 1 1 - 1 . 0 5 Mauritius (MUS) -1.11 -1.05 -1.02 -1.05
Canada (CAN) -2.29 -1.05 -1.05 -1.13 Malawi (MWI) -1.07 -1.11 -1.13 -1.04
Switzerland (CHE) -1.99 -1.07 -1.06 -1.1 Malaysia (MYS) -1.45 -1.07 -1.06 -1.05
Chile (CHL) -1.61 -1.05 -1.08 -1.1 Niger (NER) -1.12 -1.1 -1.18 -1.06
China (CHN) -2.54 -1.12 -1.14 -1.13 Nigeria (NGA) -1.59 -1.29 -1.15 -1.11
Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) -1.32 -1.16 -1.13 -1.08 Nicaragua (NIC) -1.06 -1.06 -1.07 -1.03
Cameroon (CMR) -1.36 -1.21 -1.15 -1.12 Netherlands (NLD) -1.66 -1.04 -1.04 -1.07
Congo (COG) -1.13 -1.11 -1.09 -1.04 Norway (NOR) -1.93 -1.06 -1.08 -1.11
Colombia (COL) -1.81 -1.13 -1.08 -1.16 New Zealand (NZL) -1.56 -1.11 -1.07 -1.1
Comorros (COM) -1.04 -1.17 -1.08 -1.03 Oman (OMN) -1.23 -1.05 -1.06 -1.05
C o s t aR i c a( C R I ) - 1 . 2 3 - 1 . 0 3 - 1 . 0 4 - 1 . 0 6 Panama (PAN) -1.24 -1.05 -1.09 -1.07
Cyprus (CYP) -1.17 -1.03 -1.02 -1.05 Peru (PER) -1.74 -1.18 -1.11 -1.16
Czech Rep. (CZE) -1.36 -1.03 -1.04 -1.05 Philippines (PHL) -1.61 -1.08 -1.06 -1.07
Germany (DEU) -2.01 -1.06 -1.07 -1.14 Poland (POL) -1.51 -1.08 -1.04 -1.09
Denmark (DNK) -1.69 -1.09 -1.07 -1.11 Portugal (PRT) -1.47 -1.05 -1.03 -1.09
Algeria (DZA) -1.59 -1.13 -1.14 -1.1 Paraguay (PRY) -1.19 -1.06 -1.02 -1.07
Egypt (EGY) -1.78 -1.14 -1.13 -1.12 Romania (ROM) -1.37 -1.04 -1.06 -1.09
Spain (ESP) -1.95 -1.06 -1.05 -1.14 Rwanda (RWA) -1.12 -1.13 -1.14 -1.07
Estonia (EST) -1.09 -1.03 -1.02 -1.03 Saudi Arabia (SAU) -1.86 -1.04 -1.06 -1.13
Ethiopia (ETH) -1.17 -1.09 -1.06 -1.07 Sudan (SDN) -1.32 -1.15 -1.14 -1.08
Finland (FIN) -1.84 -1.07 -1.06 -1.12 Senegal (SEN) -1.16 -1.08 -1.11 -1.05
France (FRA) -1.93 -1.05 -1.07 -1.14 Singapore (SGP) -1.3 -1.06 -1.02 -1.04
Gabon (GAB) -1.15 -1.11 -1.12 -1.08 El Salvador (SLV) -1.25 -1.06 -1.08 -1.07
United Kingdom (GBR) -1.91 -1.07 -1.06 -1.13 Surinam (SUR) -1.02 -1.05 -1.04 -1.02
Georgia (GEO) -1.15 -1.13 -1.09 -1.05 Slovakia (SVK) -1.22 -1.03 -1.02 -1.05
Ghana (GHA) -1.15 -1.05 -1.07 -1.05 Slovenia (SVN) -1.24 -1.03 -1.03 -1.05
Guinea (GIN) -1.19 -1.12 -1.1 -1.08 Sweden (SWE) -2.01 -1.06 -1.07 -1.11
Gambia (GMB) -1.04 -1.05 -1.06 -1.04 Togo (TGO) -1.08 -1.05 -1.06 -1.04
Greece (GRC) -1.71 -1.04 -1.03 -1.12 Thailand (THA) -1.83 -1.15 -1.08 -1.08
Guatemala (GTM) -1.38 -1.09 -1.14 -1.09 Trinidad T. (TTO) -1.15 -1.07 -1.07 -1.06
Guyana (GUY) -1.03 -1.04 -1.04 -1.02 Tunisia (TUN) -1.24 -1.04 -1.06 -1.06
Hong Kong (HKG) -1.57 -1.04 -1.02 -1.04 Turkey (TUR) -1.97 -1.11 -1.09 -1.14
Honduras (HND) -1.11 -1.05 -1.09 -1.04 Tanzania (TZA) -1.28 -1.09 -1.09 -1.11
Croatia (HRV) -1.22 -1.04 -1.02 -1.07 Uganda (UGA) -1.22 -1.08 -1.17 -1.09
Hungary (HUN) -1.32 -1.06 -1.05 -1.06 Ukraine (UKR) -1.46 -1.05 -1.06 -1.1
Indonesia (IDN) -2.09 -1.12 -1.13 -1.14 Uruguay (URY) -1.4 -1.08 -1.1 -1.12
India (IND) -3.26 -1.31 -1.38 -1.33 United States (USA) -3.39 -1.1 -1.16 -1.3
Ireland (IRL) -1.51 -1.04 -1.05 -1.07 Venezuela (VEN) -1.85 -1.09 -1.12 -1.15
Iran (IRN) -1.87 -1.13 -1.15 -1.11 South Africa (ZAF) -2.04 -1.14 -1.1 -1.16
Iceland (ISL) -1.2 -1.04 -1.07 -1.07 Zambia (ZMB) -1.12 -1.06 -1.09 -1.05
Israel (ISR) -1.13 -1.06 -1.03 -1.06
28Table 2: Sample moments of the estimated import demand elasticity by Rauch
classiﬁcation a
Mean Median Standard Deviation
Diﬀerentiated goods -1.59 -1.07 2.25
Referenced price -1.84 -1.09 2.84
Homogeneous goods -1.98 -1.09 3.32
aThe HS six digit schedule is ﬁrst ﬁltered into the four digit SITC schedule which Rauch (1999) used to classify
goods. Homogenous goods are those traded on organized exchanges. Reference priced goods are those listed as having
a reference price, and diﬀerentiated goods are goods that cannot not be priced by either of these two means.
29Table 3: Average Estimated elasticities at diﬀerent levels of aggregationa
Country HS six digit ISIC three digit Country HS six digit ISIC three digit
ALB -1.12 -1.04 ITA -2.10 -1.06
ARE -1.38 -1.16 JAM -1.16 -1.10
ARG -2.52 -1.13 JOR -1.16 -1.05
ARM -1.09 -1.06 JPN -4.05 -1.23
AUS -2.49 -1.10 KEN -1.26 -1.14
AUT -1.80 -1.05 KOR -2.08 -1.10
AZE -1.18 -1.11 LBN -1.26 -1.03
BDI -1.07 -1.19 LKA -1.20 -1.10
BEL -1.51 -1.04 LTU -1.20 -1.03
BEN -1.11 -1.11 LVA -1.16 -1.03
BFA -1.10 -1.12 MAR -1.45 -1.10
BGD -1.65 -1.20 MDG -1.17 -1.12
BGR -1.18 -1.05 MDV -1.04 -1.04
BLR -1.17 -1.04 MEX -2.08 -1.06
BLZ -1.03 -1.05 MKD -1.12 -1.04
BOL -1.23 -1.07 MLI -1.15 -1.19
BRA -3.38 -1.30 MLT -1.09 -1.04
BRB -1.08 -1.04 MNG -1.05 -1.06
CAF -1.08 -1.15 MUS -1.11 -1.05
CAN -2.29 -1.05 MWI -1.07 -1.11
CHE -1.99 -1.07 MYS -1.45 -1.07
CHL -1.61 -1.05 NER -1.12 -1.10
CHN -2.54 -1.12 NGA -1.59 -1.29
CIV -1.32 -1.16 NIC -1.06 -1.06
CMR -1.36 -1.21 NLD -1.66 -1.04
COG -1.13 -1.11 NOR -1.93 -1.06
COL -1.81 -1.13 NZL -1.56 -1.11
COM -1.04 -1.17 OMN -1.23 -1.05
CRI -1.23 -1.03 PAN -1.24 -1.05
CYP -1.17 -1.03 PER -1.74 -1.18
CZE -1.36 -1.03 PHL -1.61 -1.08
DEU -2.01 -1.06 POL -1.51 -1.08
DNK -1.69 -1.09 PRT -1.47 -1.05
DZA -1.59 -1.13 PRY -1.19 -1.06
EGY -1.78 -1.14 ROM -1.37 -1.04
ESP -1.95 -1.06 RWA -1.12 -1.13
EST -1.09 -1.03 SAU -1.86 -1.04
ETH -1.17 -1.09 SDN -1.32 -1.15
FIN -1.84 -1.07 SEN -1.16 -1.08
FRA -1.93 -1.05 SGP -1.30 -1.06
GAB -1.15 -1.11 SLV -1.25 -1.06
GBR -1.91 -1.07 SUR -1.02 -1.05
GEO -1.15 -1.13 SVK -1.22 -1.03
GHA -1.15 -1.05 SVN -1.24 -1.03
GIN -1.19 -1.12 SWE -2.01 -1.06
GMB -1.04 -1.05 TGO -1.08 -1.05
GRC -1.71 -1.04 THA -1.83 -1.15
GTM -1.38 -1.09 TTO -1.15 -1.07
GUY -1.03 -1.04 TUN -1.24 -1.04
HKG -1.57 -1.04 TUR -1.97 -1.11
HND -1.11 -1.05 TZA -1.28 -1.09
HRV -1.22 -1.04 UGA -1.22 -1.08
HUN -1.32 -1.06 UKR -1.46 -1.05
IDN -2.09 -1.12 URY -1.40 -1.08
IND -3.26 -1.31 USA -3.39 -1.10
IRL -1.51 -1.04 VEN -1.85 -1.09
IRN -1.87 -1.13 ZAF -2.04 -1.14
ISL -1.20 -1.04 ZMB -1.12 -1.06
ISR -1.13 -1.06
aThe same pattern is obtained with the median elasticities by country.
30Table 4: Trade restrictiveness indices and welfare losses
Country Simple Import TRIa Variance DWL Country Simple Import TRIa Variance DWL
Average Weighted of (Million Average Weighted of (Million
Tariﬀ Tariﬀ Tariﬀ of US$) Tariﬀ Tariﬀ Tariﬀ of US$)
ALB 11.96 11.92 13.56 44.06 6.3 KOR 8.52 5.41 8.12 41.87 273
ARG 14.49 13.93 15.06 31.13 303 LBN 6.37 6.94 11.99 91.82 38.9
AUS 4.8 4.88 7.19 42.43 95 LKA 7.72 7.77 14.86 71.02 23.6
AUT 4.58 4.32 6.52 18.9 132 LTU 3.8 3.13 7.71 62.44 11.9
BEL 4.6 4.74 7.17 19.28 312 LVA 3.32 2.6 6.48 45.85 4.52
BFA 12.42 10.78 13.01 46.26 4.8 MAR 28.82 24.54 31.99 514.29 390
BGD 20.07 18.82 23.91 180.55 106 MDG 4.43 3.93 5.86 16.65 0.84
BLR 10.76 9.62 11.52 35.65 29.4 MEX 17.55 16.18 21.29 143.42 1970
BOL 8.94 8.08 8.82 7.3 6.01 MLI 12.09 9.75 11.9 44.06 2.13
BRA 14.27 12.18 14.96 35.51 527 MUS 18.97 11.43 24.29 690.61 49.6
CAF 17.81 16.45 19.21 91.13 2.43 MWI 13.08 9.93 13.58 92.57 3.52
CAN 4.6 3.71 6.3 35.91 187 MYS 8.66 6.81 17.41 131.45 671
CHL 6.98 6.74 6.85 0.1 29.8 NGA 24.16 18.07 27.15 457.7 180
CHN 15.94 16.3 24.38 135.7 4070 NIC 4.98 7.33 14.12 41.88 7.69
CIV 12 9.82 11.73 46.92 14.7 NLD 4.59 4.44 6.86 19.31 279
CMR 16.35 13.37 16.06 80.48 16.4 NOR 2.21 1.63 9.46 157.49 144
COL 12.42 11.08 13.74 38.56 110 NZL 3.04 3.47 5.08 15.26 14.1
CRI 5.52 4.98 8.38 50.17 13.2 OMN 7.64 13.28 28.55 88.13 83.4
CZE 5.06 4.53 7.81 46.19 69.5 PER 13.59 13.27 13.7 13.05 67.5
DEU 4.56 4.69 7.22 19.84 912 PHL 5.43 3.9 8.51 29.79 101
DNK 4.6 4.4 6.86 19.29 81.4 POL 11.2 7.8 14.16 204.45 372
DZA 18.45 13.96 17.48 97.57 139 PRT 4.64 4.8 7.04 20.14 67.2
EGY 18.59 13.02 19.54 192.69 255 PRY 13.35 12.82 14.04 34.13 18.8
ESP 4.58 4.5 7.1 19.93 260 ROM 17.14 15.94 21.84 137.93 188
EST 0.07 0.54 2.37 0.88 0.9 RWA 9.66 9.28 11.91 47.49 1.48
ETH 17.88 14.1 18.64 159.17 17.4 SAU 11.3 9.95 11.04 12.6 162
FIN 4.61 4.02 6.58 19.04 49 SDN 4.98 5.1 20.1 125.3 24.5
FRA 4.57 4.65 7.51 19.91 737 SEN 12.36 10.62 12.4 47.42 9.44
GAB 18.4 14.87 17.77 90.55 13.6 SGP 00 0 0 0
GBR 4.58 4.56 7 20.01 602 SLV 7.35 7.26 11.02 79.44 15.5
GHA 12.95 9.91 13.65 103.3 16.8 SVN 10.22 10.88 12.98 39.78 69.7
GRC 4.69 4.41 7.15 20.18 58 SWE 4.6 3.99 6.36 19.22 103
GTM 6.69 6.39 9.57 62.39 15.5 THA 15.41 12.36 19.74 177.33 779
HKG 00 0 0 0 TTO 8.2 7.66 12.55 102.01 14.5
HND 7.12 7.53 11.04 50.44 10.7 TUN 28.86 27.47 30.42 175.13 302
HUN 9.24 8.11 12.65 95.5 134 TUR 9.25 6.41 15.99 345.43 396
IDN 6.76 5.02 10.02 99.35 140 TZA 16.39 14.53 16.97 75.97 17.1
IND 31.87 30.88 36.61 178.2 1740 UGA 7.95 7.53 9.46 32.44 3.63
IRL 4.64 4.02 6.89 20.27 57.4 UKR 6.57 4.16 8.43 47.86 40.3
ISL 4.15 3.71 8.03 51.86 5.35 URY 14.64 14.22 15.37 36.74 37
ITA 4.58 4.59 7.31 19.93 517 USA 4.17 3.93 15.18 134.81 7070
JOR 15.58 13.26 18.88 192.14 51.1 VEN 12.69 13.74 15.84 37.22 156
JPN 3.29 3.05 6.17 22.99 512 ZAF 8.02 6 11.92 127.64 146
KEN 17.96 17.07 23.05 176.69 49.9 ZMB 11.71 10.08 13.28 87.5 4.44
aThis is Feenstra’s (1995) linear approximation of Anderson and Neary’s (1992, 1994) trade restrictiveness index.












32Figure 2: Distribution of import demand elasticities: Metal vs. Machinery
elasticity




33Figure 3: Import demand elasticities and Log of GDP

























































































































34Figure 4: Import demand elasticities and Log of GDP per capita
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